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Of the many potential land mines lurking in the Open Internet order, perhaps the most surprising 
is the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over interconnection agreements. When he first 
launched the net neutrality proceeding in 2009, then-Chairman Julius Genachowski was quick to 
snuff out any concern that the Commission sought to regulate the Internet. He explained to 
anyone who would listen that the FCC was interested only in the “on-ramps to the Internet,” the 
last-mile broadband networks that connect end-users to the network.1 Similarly, the 2014 Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking tentatively concluded that the Open Internet rules should not affect 
agreements for the exchange of traffic between networks.2 Although the Commission invited 
comments on this conclusion, Chairman Tom Wheeler explained during the comment period that 
interconnection is “not a net neutrality issue” and a Commission spokesman clarified that 
“[p]eering and interconnection are not under consideration in the Open Internet proceeding.”3  
 
But changing dynamics within the Internet ecosystem, specifically the rise of over-the-top video 
as the single largest driver of Internet traffic, brought interconnection disputes increasingly into 
the public’s eye in 2014. Policymakers and advocates grew concerned that ISPs could use 
interconnection disputes to make an end-run around net neutrality restrictions. These concerns 
were fanned by Netflix, generator of up to one-third of peak-time Internet traffic, which sought 
regulatory intervention to correct its failure to negotiate settlement-free interconnection 
agreements with several prominent ISPs. As a result, the Open Internet order explicitly grants the 
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Commission potentially broad authority to review broadband providers’ interconnection 
practices and to hear interconnection-related complaints filed by consumers.4  
 
In part because of this about-face, the interconnection provisions may be one of the portions of 
the Open Internet order most vulnerable to reversal on judicial review. But a reversal on 
procedural grounds does not address the issue of what role the Commission should play when 
governing interconnection in a Title II world. Interconnection is an important issue, and the FCC 
should play a role in its oversight – particularly since reclassification has displaced the FTC’s 
antitrust authority over broadband providers – but not necessarily the role that the Open Internet 
order and various commenters contemplate. Rather, the Commission should operate as a type of 
sector-specific antitrust authority, intervening in significant instances where there is credible 
evidence of anticompetitive harm, but otherwise allowing a robust interconnection market to 
evolve along with the changing Internet ecosystem. 
 
Interconnection and the Open Internet Order 
 
The Commission claims that authority to regulate interconnection agreements flows from its 
decision to reclassify broadband providers as Title II telecommunications services. Sections 201 
and 202 prohibit broadband providers from engaging in unjust or unreasonable practices when 
providing broadband service to consumers. The Open Internet order explains that this includes 
the exchange of Internet traffic by an edge provider or an intermediary with the broadband 
provider’s network.5 These exchanges of traffic, governed by interconnection agreements, are 
provided “for and in connection with” broadband service and therefore fall within the 
Commission’s purview.6  
 
Interestingly, the order did not explicitly rely upon the portions of the Communications Act that 
specifically govern interconnection. The Commission forebeared from applying Sections 
251(a)(1) and 251(c)(2), which requires telecommunications carriers to interconnect directly or 
indirectly with one another and foists additional obligations on incumbent local exchange 
carriers.7 Section 201(a) also gives the Commission authority to order interconnection if the 
public interest so demands.8 The order does not forebear from applying Section 201(a). And in 
light of its explicit statement that Section 201 applies to broadband providers, the order at least 
implicitly suggests that this authority is available to the Commission. But throughout the 
discussion of interconnection, the order relies primarily upon the Section 201(b) duty to avoid 
unjust and unreasonable practices rather than Section 201(a). 
 
To its credit, the Commission thus far has chosen to wade into the interconnection market 
slowly. It explicitly declined to impose the full panoply of net neutrality provisions to a 
broadband provider’s interconnection practices, such as the prohibitions on blocking, throttling, 
and paid prioritization, and the awkwardly-named no unreasonable interference/disadvantage 
standard.9 The Commission recognized that it lacks the experience and background necessary to 
craft specific rules governing Internet traffic exchange.10 Instead, it will develop its 
interconnection jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis in response to claims filed with the 
Commission under Section 208 alleging that broadband providers are engaged in unjust or 
unreasonable practices.11  
3 
 
 
While this regulatory humility is commendable, the requirement that any interconnection 
practices be just and reasonable provides little guidance to networks seeking to interconnect. The 
Commission’s prior telephone interconnection decisions are largely inapposite, as they involve 
very different market conditions and generally apply a more comprehensive regulatory regime 
including tariffing that the agency (quite correctly) chose not to apply to broadband providers. 
As noted above, a reviewing court may strike the Open Internet order’s interconnection 
provisions on procedural grounds, because the notice of proposed rulemaking did not adequately 
signal to interested parties, in a way that invited substantive comment, that the agency might 
regulate interconnection. But even if the rules survive, they merely provide the Commission with 
the jurisdiction to regulate interconnection agreements. They provide little explanation about 
how the Commission should go about exercising that authority.   
 
Interconnection Disputes and the Need for a (Limited) Regulatory Response 
 
As the Free State Foundation scholars discussed in response to last year’s #CommActUpdate 
interconnection white paper, the Commission should assume some oversight of the 
interconnection market.12 The Internet is not a single network, but a collection of several 
thousand autonomous networks, working together to move packets from origination to delivery.  
Interconnection agreements fuse those networks together, and therefore are vitally important to 
the health of a robust Internet. Denser, more interconnected networks help promote the Internet 
as a tool for expression, news, education, and communication – all socially valuable activities 
that public policy should facilitate. 
 
As in many areas of the economy, interconnection offers some incentives for anticompetitive 
abuse. There are many benign reasons why one network may refuse to interconnect with another 
– perhaps most obviously, to pressure a sending network into assuming the direct or indirect 
costs of offloading its traffic onto a receiving network. But some networks may also be tempted 
to deny interconnection as a strategy to restrict competition in a way that harms consumers. As 
discussed below, networking innovations have reduced the opportunities for such behavior, but 
the potential for such abuse demands some regulatory oversight.  
 
But unlike other areas of the economy (including net neutrality), it is unclear that traditional 
antitrust law alone is sufficient to remedy these concerns. Historically, antitrust proved effective 
at policing interconnection abuses in the telephone context – arguably more effective than 
Commission oversight. But the Supreme Court’s landmark Trinko decision13 has cast significant 
doubt upon the usefulness of the tool going forward.14 Trinko (correctly) reaffirmed the general 
right of a company to determine with whom it will deal, and on what terms. The decision neither 
affirmed nor rejected the essential facilities doctrine, but it hinted strongly that “forced access” 
was not an appropriate remedy. Moreover, the Commission itself effectively diminished 
whatever power antitrust law has over interconnection markets post-Trinko: by reclassifying 
broadband providers as common carriers, the FCC stripped the Federal Trade Commission of 
jurisdiction to investigate broadband providers’ practices under the FTC Act.15 For these 
independent reasons, it is not objectionable for the FCC to step into the gap that its 
reclassification decision created, to assume the mantle of policing interconnection markets for 
anticompetitive abuse. 
4 
 
 
While the Commission has a role to play, it should approach any intervention with caution. The 
Open Internet order admits that the Commission does not yet have a firm understanding of the 
complexities of interconnection markets.16 But we can identify three broad themes with certainty.  
 
First, interconnection markets are complex. There are more than thirty-five thousand networks 
that comprise the Internet. Some have a global footprint, while others operate only locally. Some 
offer only transit service, while others bundle delivery with other products and services. Thus the 
universe of potential interconnection agreement terms is vast, providing a steep learning curve 
for regulators and high potential for error. 
 
Second, interconnection markets are competitive. Content providers have a wide variety of 
transit and other providers to choose from when determining how to get content to the Internet, 
and transit networks have myriad options to deliver their traffic to its final destinations. As 
evidence of this competitiveness, Internet transit prices have fallen by an astounding 30% per 
year on average, from $1200/Mbps in 1998 to $0.94/Mbps in 2014.17 And even with today’s 
razor-thin margins, this trend shows no signs of abating. Streaming Media analyst Dan Rayburn 
has chronicled similar trends for Content Delivery Network (CDN) prices, which can be 
considered a quasi-substitute for traditional transit.18  
 
Finally, interconnection markets are evolving, largely in response to evolutionary trends 
elsewhere in the Internet ecosystem. The Open Internet order recognizes this phenomenon.19 The 
rise of streaming video as the dominant form of Internet traffic has disrupted traditional transit 
and peering arrangements. The asymmetric flow of video traffic and rise of CDNs as an 
alternative to traditional transit has put pressure on network providers to adapt interconnection 
arrangements to meet these new realities.  
 
As I discussed in an earlier Perspectives from FSF Scholars release,20 this need to evolve in 
response to changes elsewhere in the Internet ecosystem likely explains recent interconnection 
disputes that have grabbed the public’s attention, particularly those involving Netflix. Netflix 
traditionally partnered with third-party transit providers and CDNs to deliver its content to 
consumers. An agreement with one such provider, Cogent, combined with the growth in 
popularity of Netflix’s service, created a significant increase in the traffic Cogent sought to 
offload to last-mile networks such as Comcast and Verizon. This increase overloaded the ports 
connecting these networks and upset existing peering agreements, which were likely based on 
more symmetric traffic flow assumptions. Cogent and its partners struggled to determine who 
would pay for upgrades and on what terms traffic would be exchanged going forward. Netflix 
and its customers suffered from congestion. Ultimately, Netflix solved the problem by signing 
paid interconnection agreements directly with several last-mile broadband networks – thus 
eliminating the middleman in ways that are likely more efficient and beneficial to consumers. 
 
This is the challenge for the Commission’s interconnection regulators: they should intervene 
when there is credible evidence of anticompetitive threats, but without distorting the natural 
evolution of interconnection markets or retarding the ability of networks to adapt to stimuli 
elsewhere in the Internet ecosystem. The challenge is compounded by the fact that market 
evolution is often messy and has adverse interim consequences for consumers. But the 
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Commission must resist the urge to label each consumer disruption a market failure in need of 
regulatory intervention. Netflix has complained that service quality suffered until it negotiated 
directly with broadband providers, and that it ultimately agreed to paid interconnection 
agreements rather than settlement-free agreements with the company’s OpenConnect content 
delivery network. But this amounts to little more than a complaint that the market is not evolving 
in the precise direction that Netflix wished it to. Without more, the case for regulatory 
intervention is at best unclear – and to yield to the company’s demands for FCC intervention 
would have thwarted the development of the paid interconnection solution to the logjam created 
by vastly increased video traffic. 
 
Conclusion: Toward a More Concrete Interconnection Governance Regime 
 
Interconnection disputes are likely to occur from time to time, coinciding with changing 
consumer behavior and the consequent effect these changes have on the flow of bits across 
networks. The Commission is correct that it is premature to develop a comprehensive regulatory 
response to this phenomenon. But the discussion above yields three key nodes around which the 
Commission should begin building its policy. 
 
Transparency 
 
The Commission should begin by attempting to gather more information to understand how 
interconnection markets work. When faced with Netflix’s complaints in early 2014 that paid 
peering posed a threat to the Open Internet, the Commission appropriately responded by asking 
for copies of the interconnection agreements in question, to develop a better understanding of 
how these markets work. The Open Internet order suggests that the learning curve is steep, and 
the agency has not yet satisfied itself – or many other observers – that it understands the complex 
dynamics at work in this market. Before undertaking a comprehensive law of interconnection, 
under Sections 201 and 202 or otherwise, the Commission should gather additional facts to 
understand better the dynamic nature of this market and where the potential for anticompetitive 
abuse may lie. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that this does not, and should not, justify a policy to make the details 
of these agreements public, as some advocates have suggested. Interconnection agreements are 
generally governed by nondisclosure agreements and could contain valuable trade secrets that 
individual networks seek to remain confidential. As I have discussed at length in an earlier 
Perspectives from FSF Scholars release,21 antitrust law has long warned that the disclosure of 
competitively sensitive information among rivals can facilitate tacit collusion, and even absent 
collusion, revealing price and cost information can have an adverse effect on competition. The 
Commission should reject calls to mandate the public disclosure of individual interconnection 
agreements. 
 
Intervention 
 
The Commission should adopt an intervention standard informed by antitrust principles, 
commensurate with the notion that anticompetitive concerns comprise the primary justification 
for regulating in this space. In a typical anticompetitive foreclosure case, the government would 
6 
 
have to prove that the defendant has market power and that the conduct in question has an 
anticompetitive effect. Similarly, the Commission should not intervene in an interconnection 
dispute absent a finding that one of the parties has market power. Given the rise of multi-homing, 
such findings should be rare. Multi-homing is the concept that content and transit providers rely 
upon multiple providers to deliver traffic to Internet endpoints. The existence of multiple entry 
points into a network reduces the likelihood that a network can exercise market power in a way 
that forecloses traffic.  
 
Intervention should also be limited to disputes that exhibit at least the potential for sustained 
consumer harm. The sustained modifier helps distinguish instances in which market evolution is 
messy and causes some transient interruption to consumer service. Such disruptions may be 
regrettable but do not alone rise to the level justifying regulatory intervention. As noted above, 
market transitions can be messy affairs, and the Commission should avoid the temptation to ride 
to the rescue any time consumers or competitors claim to be adversely affected by sharp 
practices within a changing market. 
 
This is likely a narrower standard than that afforded by the Title II “unjust or unreasonable 
practices” standard – and much narrower than Section 201(a)’s public interest standard for 
regulating interconnection practices. But these modest guideposts fit what ought to be a display 
of humility on the Commission’s part when discussing interconnection markets. Given the robust 
competition in this space and the speed with which interconnection agreements respond to fluid 
market conditions, regulatory intervention should be the exception rather than the rule. For the 
Internet to grow and develop in response to changing consumer demand, network providers must 
be given significant flexibility to draft appropriate interconnection agreements, even if dynamic 
new terms differ substantially from existing practices. An antitrust-like standard preserves the 
space for that evolution to occur while still providing sufficient authority for the Commission to 
block practices that harm consumers and competition. 
 
Remedy 
 
Upon finding that a particular dispute or practice is harmful, the agency’s primary recourse 
should be to refer the parties to private negotiation. Perhaps the first step should be to order 
mediation, and if that fails, require the parties to attend mandatory arbitration to resolve their 
disputes. Private ordering is preferable to Commission-imposed interconnection because of the 
complexity associated with interconnection. Interconnection agreements can involve several 
different practices, and can themselves represent only one facet of the full relationship between 
the two parties. Once a problem is laid bare, the parties have a wide range of tools with which to 
find consensus, especially when prompted by an effective dispute resolution specialist. This 
means that a privately negotiated solution is likely to be more efficient than one imposed by the 
regulator from a more limited set of options.  
 
By asserting jurisdiction over interconnection disputes, the Commission opened a brave new 
world in Internet regulation. The Open Internet order’s supposed caution and humility with 
regard to this issue is encouraging, at least if taken at face value. The discussion above is not 
meant to comprise a robust jurisprudence of interconnection disputes, but rather a set of first  
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principles meant to guide the Commission as it first dips its toes into interconnection waters. The 
Commission’s first steps should be to gain a better understanding of interconnection markets, 
and intervene only in instances of anticompetitive harm to prod the parties to negotiate a 
solution. In this way, the Commission can protect consumers from legitimate harm while 
minimizing the risk that intervention would otherwise pose to the continued health and stability 
of the Internet.  
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, a member of the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors, is an 
Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
 
The Free State Foundation is an independent, nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located 
in Rockville, Maryland. 
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